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Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC: Limiting the Liability
of Foreign Corporations by Curbing the
Breadth of the Alien Tort Statute
S UDIPTA DAS *©
INTRODUCTION

In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC (“Jesner”),1 the Supreme Court addressed whether the
law of nations imposes liability upon corporate entities for human rights violations
committed by their employees and, more specifically, whether foreign corporations
may be defendants in lawsuits brought in under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).2 The
Supreme Court held that without further action or legislation from Congress, courts
may not extend ATS liability to foreign corporations, thus barring corporations from
being defendants in ATS suits.3 The Court wrongly held that foreign corporations
may not be brought in as defendants in lawsuits under the ATS, as this may enable
many potential defendant corporations to engage in human rights violations
without redress. However, the Court was proper in holding that Congress must
speak on the ATS and specifically elucidate the extent to which ATS liability may
apply to foreign corporations with designated limitations.4
I.

T HE CASE

Petitioners in this case consist of both foreign persons who were injured, captured,
or killed by terrorists overseas, or family members and representatives of the
estates of those who were subject to those harms.5 Petitioners brought suit against
Arab Bank, PLC (“Arab Bank”) for allegedly financing the terrorist organizations

©Sudipta Das, 2020.
* Sudipta Das is a J.D. Candidate, 2020, at the University of Maryland, Francis King Carey School of Law. I
appreciate the student editors and staff on the Journal of Business and Technology Law who have all helped
this paper come to fruition through their review. I would also like to thank Aryeh Rabinowitz, Esq. for his
insightful feedback and time. Lastly, I would like to thank my mother, Mrs. Shibani Das, and my father, Dr.
Babulal Das for their constant love, encouragement, and support throughout this process.
1. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
2. Id. at 1394.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1407–08.
5. In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom Jesner v.
Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
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responsible for petitioners’ grievances.6 Specifically, petitioners assert that Arab
Bank was heavily involved in the terrorist scheme because it had financed terrorist
attacks7 in three ways: first, by maintaining “accounts that the terrorist
organizations used to solicit funds directly”;8 second, by maintaining “accounts that
proxy organizations and individuals used to raise funds for the terrorist
organizations”;9 and third, by playing “an active role in identifying the family of
‘martyrs’10 and facilitating payments to them … on behalf of the terrorist
organizations.”11
In court, petitioners brought their claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act12 (“ATA”),
and the ATS.13 The District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that
petitioners could not bring claims against foreign corporations under the ATS as per
the decision given by the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co
(“Kiobel I”),14 which held that the ATS does not hold corporations liable. 15 The
district court reasoned a “decision by a panel of the Second Circuit ‘is binding unless
and until it is overruled by the Court en banc or by the Supreme Court.’”16 Kiobel I
was in fact heard by the Supreme Court (“Kiobel II”),17 however, the Supreme Court
left the question of corporate liability under the ATS unanswered. 18 On appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, petitioners in this case argued that the
facts of their allegations sufficiently “touch and concern” United States territories 19
in a non-attenuated way to support jurisdiction. Additionally, petitioners suggested
6.

In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 147.
Petitioners cite several groups that were funded by Arab Bank, including: “Islamic Resistance
Movement (“Hamas”), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”), the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade (“AAMB”), and the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (“PFLP”). Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Suicide bombers hired by these terrorist groups, whose families were paid after they detonated the
bombs. Id.
11. Id.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). This statute provides that any “national of the United States injured in his or her
person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors or
heirs, may sue therefore in any appropriate district court of the United States.” Id.
13. In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 147 (explaining that the ATS differs from the ATA in that the former
provides jurisdiction “only with respect to suits by ‘aliens,’” while the latter provides jurisdiction only for suits
by United States nationals. Many of the petitioners in this case are foreign nationals).
14. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d 569 U.S. 108, 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013).
15. Id. at 148–49.
16. In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 148 (quoting Baraket v. Holder, 632 F.3d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 2011)).
17. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
18. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1395 (2018).
19. The New York branch of Arab Bank allegedly participated in CHIPS transactions to hold money &
transfer funds while proxy charities (actually terrorist fronts) in Texas used an account with Arab Bank to
transfer funds to other proxy charities in foreign nations. Id. at 1406, 1435.
7.
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that since Kiobel II20 did not speak on whether or not corporations are covered by
the ATS, it actually implied that the ATS may allow for corporate liability. 21
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision based on Kiobel I and
stated that the Court’s former ruling not to include corporate liability should be
upheld.22 However, the Court did acknowledge a circuit split 23 and noted that there
was a “growing consensus” among the sister circuits to hold that the ATS should
extend liability to incorporated entities.24 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address whether a corporation can be subject to liability and suit under
the ATS.25
II.

L EGAL BACKGROUND

In the United States, claims are rarely brought under the Alien Tort Statute; in fact,
many of the initial cases interpreting the statute came nearly a hundred or more
years after it was written.26 However, when the ATS has been used, it has provided
redress for many egregious human rights violations committed by various
defendants. Section II.A reviews the statute itself and several of the early cases
delineating the limits of the ATS. Section II.B. reviews the case, Kiobel II, which
brought the issue of whether corporations fall under the scope of the ATS’s
jurisdiction to the attention of the Supreme Court.
A. Prominent Cases Discussing the ATS
Originally part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,27 the ATS reads: “The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28
While the text of the statute itself is quite succinct, the statute has had great
influence—in fact, foreign citizens have used the ATS to gain relief since the 1980s.29
Plaintiffs have used the statute to obtain remedies in U.S. courts for human-rights
violations that have occurred outside of the U.S., but are still related to the U.S. in

20.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 148.
22. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1396.
23. Decisions in the Courts of Appeal for the Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits agree that
foreign corporations can be subject to suit under the ATS. Id. at 1396.
24. In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 151.
25. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1395.
26. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) discussed below, brought the ATS into issue in 1980.
The ATS was written in 1789.
27. This act created the federal district courts & delineated what their jurisdictions covered. Jesner, 138 S.
Ct. at 1396–97.
28. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948).
29. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (this was the first case to actively examine the ATS).
21.
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some manner.30 The first case to actively employ the ATS in this sense was Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala.31 Decided in 198032 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Filartiga “paved the way for a new conceptualization of the ATS.” 33 The
appellants in that case were two Paraguayan citizens who had lodged a case against
another Paraguayan citizen who was living in the United States.34 The appellee, a
former police chief in Paraguay, had allegedly caused the death of appellants’ family
member by torturing him for his political beliefs against Paraguay’s leadership. 35
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York had dismissed the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the appellants appealed the action citing the
law of nations, which prohibited egregious acts such as official torture and did not
distinguish aliens from citizens.36
The appellants argued that they could use the ATS as a vehicle by which to bring
their claims, since it explicitly states that the district courts “shall have original
jurisdiction,” for an act that is “committed in violation of the law of nations.”37 They
then argued that official torture would surely fit under this provision, and the court
agreed.38 The court found “that an act of torture committed by a state official
against one held in detention violates established norms of the international law of
human rights, and hence [also violates] the law of nations.” 39 As an act of torture
is covered by the law of nations, then such an act is also covered by United States
federal courts; and thus, since the law of nations falls within the federal common
law, the ATS must also come within the purview of federal-question jurisdiction.40
The appellee conceded that official torture may be covered by the ATS, but
sought dismissal based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. 41 The Court struck this
argument down, noting that “[common] law courts of general jurisdiction regularly
adjudicate transitory tort claims between individuals over whom they exercise
personal jurisdiction, wherever the tort occurred.” 42 Thus, although none of the
parties in Filartiga was a citizen of the United States, whenever an alleged torturer
was found and served with process by an alien within the borders of the United

30.

Id. at 877–78 (2d Cir. 1980).
See generally id.
32. This case was decided nearly one hundred and seventy years after the ATS was originally written.
33. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International Implications of the Alien Tort Statute, 16
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 607, 610 (2004).
34. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 880.
37. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948).
38. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884.
39. Id. at 880.
40. Id. at 885.
41. Id.
42. Id.
31.
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States (satisfying personal jurisdiction requirements), they may be brought in. This
idea is also supported by the language in the first Judiciary Act,43 which denotes that
federal jurisdiction may preside over aliens for suits where principles of
international law are in issue.44
Over twenty years later, the ATS was again brought into issue in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain,45 the first Supreme Court case to speak on the ATS. In this case, plaintiff
Alvarez brought a claim under the ATS against Sosa for arbitrary arrest and
detention, after he was abducted by Sosa prior to being arrested. 46 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that Alvarez’s arrest was arbitrary due to his
abduction and thus, violated international law and could be brought in under the
ATS like the official torture claim in Filartiga.47
However, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, clarifying that
the ATS itself cannot be used to create a cause of action.48 Instead, the Court
clarified that the ATS can only be used as a method of bringing in claims by setting
jurisdiction “for a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of
nations.”49 Here, Alvarez’s claim would not fit within the purview of accepted
actions—although he was abducted and subsequently arrested, his arrest lasted for
less than twenty-four hours and did not subject him to any outrageous amount of
discomfort;50 in fact, he was later transferred into the custody of proper
authorities.51 Ultimately, Alvarez’s short stint in jail did not fall under what could
be considered a violation of the law of nations.
The Court defined the acts that do violate the law of nations as actions that “rest
on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms [the
Court has] recognized.”52 This sentence would become a two-part test created by
Sosa to be used in ATS cases: the first prong asking whether the claim relates to a
norm that has been violated and is a norm universally recognized by the civilized
world;53 and the second prong asking courts to decide whether the claim is so

43.

§9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
45. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). See also id. at 733 n.20 (“A related consideration is
whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being
sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”).
46. Id. at 697–99.
47. Id. at 699.
48. Id. at 720.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 738.
51. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004).
52. Id. at 725; see also generally Pamela J. Stephens, Spinning Sosa: Federal Common Law, the Alien Tort
Statute, and Judicial Restraint, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 32–33 (2007).
53. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
44.
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specific as to be comparable enough with violations of international law in place at
the time the ATS was effected.54 Naturally, the Court explained that the ATS’s scope
would be expanded outside of violations recognized only in the eighteenth century,
but the Court also made clear that only truly horrendous human rights violations
that are internationally recognized should be the claims for which the ATS is used. 55
Thus, Alvarez’s claim did not pass the first prong of the Sosa test because his few
hours in detention could not be considered a horrendous violation of any
internationally-recognized norm.56 Crimes that are exemplary of violating such
norms would include torture (as in Filartiga), “cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment … genocide … war crimes … crimes against humanity … summary
execution … prolonged arbitrary detention … [and] forced disappearance.” 57
While these crimes are archetypal of what can be brought under an ATS claim,
the actual requirements are still quite vague. In Doe v. Qi58 the Court held that even
though the specific limits of each crime may make the applicability of the ATS
unclear,59 the ATS will be applicable in “clear cases.”60
Undoubtedly, the use of the ATS in these cases has created controversy, and
although Congress has yet to speak on the matter, many Courts and scholars alike
have suggested that Congress do away with the statute.61 The crux of the problem
appears to be that many disfavor the United States’ involvement in human rights
violations that have been occurring outside of the country—that it is a form of
judicial overreach to allow the exercise of legal jurisdiction in the United States for
violations that have occurred in foreign countries, especially when the United States
has otherwise good relations with those countries.62 A circuit split had formed over
this issue, especially in the realm of whether corporations could be held liable under
the ATS just as individual persons could be held liable.63 That question was initially
posed in Kiobel I.64
54.

Id.
Id. at 725.
56. Id. at 727.
57. Stephens, supra note 52 at 5, 7.
58. Doe v. Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
59. Sosa is exemplary of this, where the plaintiff was clearly arbitrarily arrested and detained illegally, but
despite the act being wrong in and of itself, the fact that his arrest was not that long and did not cause suffering
voided his use of the ATS.
60. Additionally, there are differing levels of invasions of bodily integrity that are to be considered cruel
and not cruel—choking a plaintiff being detained for one day was not considered cruel by the Human Rights
Committee, but sexual assault of a plaintiff was considered cruel by both the Human Rights Committee and the
European Court of Human Rights. Doe v. Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1322, 1323–24 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
61. Bradley Curtis, Judicial Foreign Policy We Cannot Afford, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/17/AR2009041702859.html.
62. Id.
63. See supra footnote 23 and accompanying text.
64. 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
55.
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Answering the Un-Answered Question in Kiobel II

Kiobel I was decided by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 2010. In that case,
the court limited the breadth of ATS’s jurisdictional reach, stating that “customary
international law has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate liability for
international crimes, and no international tribunal has ever held a corporation liable
for a violation of the laws of nations.”65 Thus, any plaintiffs’ claims against a
corporation are likely to fall outside of the narrow purview of the ATS’s
jurisdiction.66
However, the statute itself does not have any mention of who falls within its
jurisdiction except for the words “action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the laws of nations.”67 There is no real clarity as to whether the phrase
“an alien” refers to individuals alone or to both individuals and corporate entities.68
The statute is also unclear as to who is committing the violation—the language is
passive and does not identify whether actionable crimes can be committed only by
either individual persons or again, by a corporate entity. As for the court’s holding
in Kiobel I, while the Second Circuit stated that corporations could not be brought
in under the ATS, other circuits ruled on the side that corporations could and should
be brought in and held liable under the statute, including the Seventh Circuit, 69 the
Ninth Circuit,70 and the D.C. Circuit.71
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for Kiobel II 2013; however, the question
of whether the ATS could be used in lawsuits against foreign corporations was left
unresolved, and the Second Circuit’s holding has been subsequently acknowledged
as proper by the Supreme Court in Jesner.72 Therefore, the Supreme Court’s holding
in Jesner simultaneously answered this previously unanswered question in Kiobel I,
where the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the ATS did not extend
to suits against corporations.73 Kiobel I’s holding is now binding precedent, and
foreign corporations cannot be sued under the ATS.

65.

Kiobel, 621, F.3d at 120.
Id.
67. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948).
68. See generally Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to
Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97 (2009) (discussing whether or not a corporation
is to be considered a “person,” or if this is a legal fiction that holds no merit; often corporations are treated as
a person in that they have certain relationships with the government and court system because they can sue
and be sued).
69. Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011).
70. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 744–45, 747–48 (9th Cir. 2011).
71. Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp. No. 09-7125 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
72. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1396, 1398, 1403, 1408 (2018).
73. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 210 (2d Cir. 2010).
66.
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III.

T HE COURT ’S R EASONING

In Jesner, the Supreme Court wrongly determined that the ATS does not impose
liability on corporations for human rights violations committed by its employees.
Section III.A will discuss Justice Kennedy’s Opinion written for the majority, which
focused on narrowing the liability the ATS could impose upon corporations. That
Section will also examine the irony of the majority’s opinion in stating that Congress
should clarify the meaning of certain terms within the ATS, while simultaneously
engaging in judicial overreach by defining those same terms. Section III.B will
examine Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan. Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion considered the long-standing
negative effects the majority’s decision will have, and rightly supports a broader
understanding of the ATS’s words, “an alien.” 74 The Dissenting opinion rightfully
would have left the ATS open to interpretation, until the legislative branch decides
it truly wants to bar “corporations” from the definition of “an alien.”
A. The ATS’s Scope has Become Overly-Narrowed, Allowing for Corporations
to Reign Supreme Over Transnational Human Rights – Justice Kennedy’s
Majority Opinion
With Justice Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court held that foreign
corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS. 75 The Court
reasoned primarily that the issue revolves around the of separation of powers, and
that it would be better placed upon Congress to determine the bounds of ATS
liability.76
Justice Kennedy first walked through the Court’s analysis in Kiobel II77 and
acknowledged that the Court had left the question of corporate liability under the
ATS unanswered when it decided that case.78 Judge Cabranes, who wrote the
majority opinion in Kiobel I, held that the ATS does not apply to alleged
international-law violations by a corporation.79 Justice Kennedy noted Kiobel’s II’s
requirement that “where the [petitioners’] claims touch and concern the territory
of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application.”80 In other words, the connection
to the United States in the allegations presented must be enough so the case is not
dismissed.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948).
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1403.
Id. at 1402.
The Opinion in this case was written by Chief justice Roberts.
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1395.
Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010).
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1398.
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As for the instant case, the majority noted that most of petitioners’ allegations
involve conduct that had occurred largely in the Middle East.81 The majority did,
however, acknowledge petitioners’ allegations that Arab Bank had used its New
York branch to clear transactions related to the purported terrorist acts and to
launder money for certain Hamas-affiliated organizations located in Texas. 82
Despite these U.S.-based activities, the Court believed that the alleged activities of
the defendant corporation and its employees had “insufficient connections to the
United States to subject it to jurisdiction under the ATS.”83 However, even if these
aforementioned connections were to reach “sufficiency,” Justice Kennedy wrote
that it was still appropriate to deny petitioners’ ATS claim, emphasizing that
international relations would be strained if the ATS was used in this manner.84
The Supreme Court decided to maintain Judge Cabranes’ holding in Kiobel I,
essentially to avoid any foreign-relations issues with other countries. Justice
Kennedy noted that Congress’s main purpose in drafting the ATS was to “avoid
foreign entanglements by ensuring the availability of a federal forum where the
failure to provide one might cause another nation to hold the United States
responsible for an injury to a foreign citizen.” 85 First, the Court studied the charters
of various international criminal tribunals, noting that such tribunals “often exclude
corporations from their jurisdictional reach,”86 and are usually limited to “natural
persons.”87 Justice Kennedy reasoned that these charters provide against a broad
holding of corporate liability under the Court’s understanding of the ATS. 88 The
Court did assert that “corporations should be subject to liability for the crimes of
their human agents,”89 but since the “international community has not yet taken
that step,” it would be averse for the Court to take such a leap forward.90
Justice Kennedy further corroborated the importance of foreign relations by
noting that there are global consequences to claims brought under the ATS. 91 For
example, the instant case has purportedly strained relations with Jordan,92 as both
Jordan and Arab Bank are considered “counterterrorism partners” to the United

81.

Id. at 1394.
Id. at 1394–95. The majority claimed these transactions (called “CHIP transactions”) are so numerous
and used widely between U.S. and foreign banks, that supervision of all these sorts of transactions is not
practicable. Id. at 1395.
83. Id. at 1398.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1397.
86. 86.Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1400 (2018).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1400–01.
89. Id. at 1402.
90. Id. at 1402.
91. Id. at 1406–07.
92. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1406–07 (2018).
82.
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States.93 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy warned of a possible slippery slope: if the
Supreme Court decided to hold foreign corporations liable under the ATS, it would
be a “precedent-setting principle” that would enable various other nations to pull
American corporations into “their courts for alleged violations of the law of
nations.”94 Thus, in light of these diplomatic disruptions, the Court believes it apt
to leave it to Congress’s discretion to determine the breadth of ATS liability. Justice
Kennedy clarified that even if the petitioners’ claims had a sufficient connection to
U.S. activity and there was no foreign relations issue, allowing an ATS claim in this
case would be problematic because the ATS has been explicitly noted to just cover
“an alien,” and not “corporations.”95
According to the Court, it is the job of Congress to further expand the definition
of “an alien” within the ATS to include corporations if they so choose, as they are
the political branch the Court believes is best able to handle the question. 96
However, as of the Jesner decision, the Court foreclosed this Congressional
opportunity by limiting the scope of ATS liability to exclude corporations
completely, and by holding that “foreign corporations may not be defendants in
suits brought under the ATS.”97
Despite suggesting that Congress did not intend for ATS liability to encompass
foreign corporations, the Court hypothesized several ways by which Congress could
incorporate foreign corporations into the ATS’s jurisdiction. 98 Justice Kennedy
posited a situation where Congress could allow foreign corporations to be subject
to ATS liability as long as “some limitations or preconditions” were in place. 99 He
suggested that corporate liability be limited to “cases where a corporation’s
management was actively complicit in the crime,” or where members of the board
of directors or other officers were acting criminally on behalf of the corporation
itself.100 The Court then reiterated that these proposed theories are better left to
the purview of Congress.101
Lastly, as a minimal consolation to petitioners, the Court suggested other vague
alternative routes to bring in petitioners’ case against Arab Bank aside from use of

93.

Id. at 1406.
Id. at 1405.
95. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948).
96. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407.
97. Id. Ironically, immediately after stating this holding Justice Kennedy pivots back to it being a decision
for Congress, stating that with “the ATS, the First Congress provided a federal remedy for a narrow-category of
international-law violations committed by individuals. Whether, more than two centuries on, a similar remedy
should be available against foreign corporations is similarly a decision that Congress must make.” Id.
98. Id. at 1407–08.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1408.
101. Id.
94.
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the ATS.102 The Court suggested that petitioners could individually sue the Arab
Bank employees who were potentially responsible for violating any international
laws under the ATS.103 Justice Kennedy also discussed the option of suing individual
employees by using the Torture Victim Protection Act104 of 1991 (“TVPA”), a
“codified note following the ATS”105 which is the only cause of action under the ATS
created by Congress rather than the Courts.106 A “key feature of TVPA” is that it
limits liability to “individuals,” thereby failing to reach corporations.107 The Court
used this feature to further support the idea that Congress would likely not have
wanted ATS liability to cover corporations instead of just natural persons. 108 The
majority concluded their opinion by noting that it is again up to Congress and not
judicial deference to decide if corporate liability is to be given under the ATS, and if
it is, what limitations are to be set upon it.109
B.

The ATS Had Potential to Bar Foreign Corporations from Engaging in
Egregious Human Rights Violations – Justice Sotomayor’s Dissenting
Opinion

According to Justice Sotomayor in her dissent, the majority’s decision will have
lasting effects, because it “absolves corporations from responsibility under the ATS
for conscience-shocking behavior.”110 Sotomayor’s concern is justified, as
immunizing corporations from the liability that the ATS provides can be detrimental
because it “allows these [corporate] entities to take advantage of the significant
benefits of the corporate form and enjoy fundamental rights111 … without having to
shoulder attendant fundamental responsibilities.” 112 In other words, these
corporations may be enabled to abuse their rights without any worry of
proscription.
Sotomayor’s dissent initially runs through the history and purpose of the ATS.
Pursuant to the first prong of the two-part Sosa test, the ATS permits federal courts
to recognize private causes of action for certain torts that violate the established
102.

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1405 (2018).
Id.
104. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1991). This was originally a
note following 28 U.S.C. §1350, that later became a codified note and its own act.
105. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1398.
106. Id. If the term “individuals” is to be limited to actual individual citizens, then the Act clearly provides
no connection between the employee-individual and employer-corporation.
107. Id. at 1404.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1408.
110. Id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
111. See also generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014).
112. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1437. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
103.
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law of nations, “without the need for any ‘further congressional action.’”113 Courts
undertaking ATS claims must first analyze the international law norm that has
allegedly been violated and determine whether it falls under the category specified
in Sosa114 (specific, universal, obligatory and internationally recognized human
rights violations recognized from the eighteenth century onwards). 115 Sotomayor
clarified Sosa’s holding, stating that the term “norm,” as used in these cases, means
substantive conduct, not just an already accepted act within the prohibited
categories of the laws of nations.116 In other words, the acts should not be limited
to what has already been deemed as a prohibited violation of a recognized norm. 117
The dissent addressed the majority’s analysis of Sosa’s footnote twenty, which
contemplated whether or not international law extends liability for norm violations
to corporations, who are private actors.118 Justice Sotomayor conducted a statutory
interpretation of the thirty-three-word ATS, noting that the statute’s phrase,
“committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States,” 119
requires only that the alleged violation be conduct that is condemned as under
international law standards.120 The relevant test is centered on a “norm-specific
inquiry, not a categorical one”;121 thus, the focus is whether act of financing
terrorism is sufficiently “specific, universal, and obligatory,” such that it passes the
rigor of Sosa’s first step.122 The focus would not be categorical, meaning it would
not center on whether private entities such as corporations may or may not commit
such a prohibited violation of said norm.123
Justice Sotomayor’s analysis critiques the majority’s limited reading of Sosa
footnote twenty,124 where the Court created a distinction between how
international law will treat corporations and natural persons. 125 The dissent noted

113.

Id. (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724, 712) (emphasis added).
542 U.S. 692 (2004).
115. See supra Part II.B, and notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
116. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1420, (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. See supra footnote 43 and accompanying text.
119. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948). (emphasis added).
120. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1421. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 1422.
122. Id.
123. Id.; See also id. at 1425 (stating that “instead of asking whether there exists a specific, universal, and
obligatory norm of corporate liability under international law, the relevant inquiry in response to the question
presented here is whether there is any reason-under either international law or our domestic law-to distinguish
between a corporation and a natural person who is alleged to have violated the law of nations under the ATS
… international law provides no such reason … [nor] does domestic law.”).
124. See supra notes 43, 91 and accompanying text.
125. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1423, (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Sotomayor notes that the “question of who must
undertake the prohibited conduct for there to be a violation of an international-law norm is one of international
114.
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that the majority’s argument is faulty, as it is insufficient to prove that international
law “distinguishes between corporations and natural persons as a categorical
matter.”126 Even if international laws are to treat the two entities entirely
differently, the ATS’s words itself do not say a corporation cannot be a violator. As
such, the focus should be on whether an egregious act was committed, and whether
such act violated norms considered under the law of nations, regardless of whether
the norm-violator was a natural person or a corporation. Justice Sotomayor had
pointed to various evidentiary pieces demonstrating that corporations do, in fact,
come under fire in the international law realm, including under Military Tribunals, 127
and International Criminal Tribunals.128
Importantly, the dissent notes another international body that recognizes
corporations129—the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism,130 an organization that requires its members to hold corporations
liable for using and collecting funds, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of
assisting terrorist acts. Incidentally, the United States is a party to this
organization—a fact that, as the dissent noted, the majority failed to point out. 131
Justice Sotomayor described how corporations have long been held liable for their
wrongdoings through routes other than the ATS—she wrote of several states within
the U.S. that have imposed “criminal and civil liability on corporations for law-ofnations violations through their domestic legal systems.” 132
Next, the minority wrote that the text of the statute itself allows for corporate
liability, as it “confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to hear” 133 civil actions
for torts, and corporations “have long been held liable in tort under the federal
common law.”134 Justice Sotomayor noted that while the ATS expressly limited “the
class of permissible plaintiffs”135 to “alien[s],”136 there is no delineation of what

law, but how a particular actor is held liable for a given law-of-nations violation generally is a question of
enforcement left up to individual states.” Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1423–24. Corporations are considered private entities, and where “private individuals … proceed
to exploit the military occupancy by acquiring private property against the will and consent of the former owner,
such action … is in violation of international law.” Id.
128. Id. (noting that the “nonnatural [corporate] entities … were responsible for genocide.”).
129. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1424 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
130. Dec. 9, 1999, Art. 2, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-49, 2178 U.N.T.S. 230.
131. See infra notes 173–174 and accompanying text.
132. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1425. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1425 (pointing to various cases see generally Philadelphia, W., & B.R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202
(1859), Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003)).
135. Id. at 1426.
136. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948).
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“alien” entails or covers in terms of types of defendants.137 The dissent
acknowledged the majority’s concern with making a decision better suited for
Congress—namely that Congress should be the body to decide what is included
under the definition of “alien.”138 However, the dissent argued that Congress’s
silence here was not inadvertent, and that silence is not demonstrative of the need
to “limit the range of permissible defendants.”139
Lastly, Justice Sotomayor concluded her dissent by addressing several other
concerns raised by the majority, including their fear with regard to the destruction
of international relations. On this matter, the minority is quite candid, explaining
that if “diplomatic strife” is to occur, it may not make much difference whether the
crime is accountable to the country as a whole, or to a corporation acting on behalf
of their country.140 As for the majority’s concerns of American corporations being
dragged into courts for their conduct around the world, the dissent pointed to the
lack of evidence given by the majority to corroborate these harrowing
complaints.141
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Jesner,142 the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the ATS to exclude
corporations, thereby barring corporations from being brought in as defendants
under ATS suits.143 The Court made an incorrect judgment in this instance because
the Court erroneously assessed petitioners’ claim as not having sufficient
connection to the U.S. While maintaining foreign relations is a valid concern, the
Court inadequately defended this concern by suggesting that corporations should
not be held liable under the ATS because of the creation of the TVPA. The Court’s
reasoning that the TVPA would be a good substitute for the ATS is flawed because
the TVPA is an even more narrowly construed method that will likely not provide
relief to petitioners such as those in the instant case. Additionally, the Court acted
in Congress’s stead by closing all interpretation of the ATS before Congress actually
spoke on the issue. The plain language of the ATS itself supports the inclusion of
corporations within its jurisdiction, and Congress’s silence on the matter should not
be used to exclude all corporate entities from liability. As stated by Justice
Sotomayor in her dissent, the “text, history, and purpose of the ATS plainly support

137. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1426 (Sotomayor, J.,, dissenting) (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (“it does not distinguish among classes of defendants.”)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1435.
141. Id. at 1435.
142. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
143. Id. at 1407–08.
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the conclusion that corporations may be held liable.” 144 The Court’s decision will
likely have rippling effects, as the ATS can no longer be used as a method to hold
corporations accountable for egregious acts that they commit.
A. The Court Erroneously Concluded that the Petitioners’ Claim was Too
Tenuous in its Connection to the United States
The Justices partaking in the majority exalted the position of Arab Bank as a foreignrelations necessity145 and gave substantially less consideration to the position of the
petitioners. The Court dismissed petitioners’ claims as being too attenuated and
minor in substantive connections to U.S. territories.146 However, petitioners’ claims
were not revolving around the actual terrorist attacks that had occurred in the
Middle East, admittedly distant from the U.S. Instead the petitioners’ claims
centered on Arab Bank’s financial support of terrorism.147 Petitioners do not assert,
as respondents allege, that Arab Bank themselves committed the killings abroad. 148
Rather, they assert that these acts were “facilitated by a foreign corporation,” and
that some of the officials who worked at Arab Bank “allowed the Bank to be used
to transfer funds to terrorist groups in the Middle East, which in turn enabled or
facilitated criminal acts of terrorism.”149
The Court is indeed correct in noting that there is a minor connection between
the actual terrorist attacks and the alleged conduct at issue—but that is exactly the
flaw in the Court’s reasoning, since the terrorist attacks were not what was brought
into issue by the petitioners. What was brought into issue was the assistance Arab
Bank and its members provided that led to a chain of actions eventually building up
to those terrorist attacks on petitioners and their families. 150 The Court clearly
stated the grievance in its own terms, having noted that what petitioners actually
attempted to prove was not that Arab Bank committed the “terrorist attacks at
issue,”151 but that Arab Bank “helped the terrorists receive the moneys in part by
means of currency clearances and bank transactions” through electronic
transfers.152
It appears that the Court conflated these allegations of improper money
handling by human agents of Arab Bank with the terrorist attacks in and of

144.

Id. at 1425 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1394, 1406–07 (majority opinion).
146. Id. at 1406. The Court stated that there was a “relatively minor connection between the terrorist
attacks at issue in this case and the alleged conduct in the United States.” Id.
147. Id. at 1394.
148. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1393 (2018).
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1406.
152. Id. at 1393.
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themselves, as demonstrated by Justice Kennedy’s opinion which noted that the
petitioners “allege that they or their family members were injured by terrorist
attacks in the Middle East over a 10-year period.”153 Almost immediately after this
sentence, the Court wrote yet again that “[most] of petitioners’ allegations involve
conduct that occurred in the Middle East”154—a repetitive phrase that seemingly
detracts from the actual allegations at hand. To the contrary, the claim at issue
involved conduct that occurred in the United States, prior to the attacks in the
Middle East.155
If the claim, as stated, revolved around Arab Bank’s illicit handling of money,
then it is difficult to see how petitioners’ allegations were in any matter attenuated.
Petitioners claimed that Arab Bank used its New York branch to (1) clear “dollardenominated transactions” through a Clearing House Interbank Payments System
(“CHIPS”), and (2) to commit money laundering for a Texas-based charity156 that is
allegedly affiliated with Hamas.157 Further, petitioners claimed that Arab Bank’s
New York branch had been helping to transfer funds from the accounts of the Texas
charity to “bank accounts of terrorist-affiliated charities in the Middle East.”158
Again, the claim focused not on the actual terrorist attacks, but the illegal financial
activities that took place in the United States; particularly in New York and Texas.
The conduct that occurred in the Middle East was facilitated by the happenings in
New York and Texas.
The events in Filartiga,159 in comparison, had an even less substantial connection
to the United States than those in the instant case. There, the plaintiffs were
permitted to bring their claims under the ATS even though all of the parties involved
were Paraguayan citizens.160 The crimes at issue were the torture and murder of
the plaintiffs’ family member—heinous acts that occurred within the Republic of
Paraguay.161 The plaintiffs brought their case against the defendant when the
parties were residing in the U.S.,162 and used the ATS to bring causes of action under
both tort law (wrongful death statutes) and international laws of human rights.163

153.

Id. at 1394.
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1394 (2018).
155. Id.
156. The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. Id. at 1395.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
160. Id. at 878.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 878–89.
163. Id. The international law claims included claims under the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights, the U.N. Declaration Against Torture, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
and others. Id.
154.

396

Journal of Business & Technology Law

SUDIPTA DAS
Analyzing the claim under step-one of the Sosa analysis, torture is clearly a violation
of a norm universally recognized by the civilized world.164
After analysis of the ATS, the court in Filartiga decided that the torture the
decedent had suffered fell directly within a violation of the law of nations as
required by the ATS, despite the fact that the heinous act did not occur within the
United States.165 Federal jurisdiction was allowed in accordance with the ATS, and
the plaintiffs prevailed on their claim, despite the tenuous substantive connection
to the United States in that case.166 The only substantive connection to the U.S. was
the fact that each party was domiciled in the U.S.167 The court in Filartiga assuaged
other worries with regard to jurisdiction by noting that jurisdiction in the U.S. is
granted if the case is grounded “upon statutes enacted by Congress or upon the
common law of the United States.”168 The ATS became a part of U.S. common law
upon adoption of the Constitution, authorized by Article III of the Constitution. 169
If the upheld precedent of Filartiga were to be decided by today’s Supreme
Court, it may very well not have passed the absurd rigor of the test of sufficient
connection to the U.S., if even illegal actions occurring within the U.S. are not
sufficient enough. Additionally, a reexamination of the text of the ATS
demonstrates that there is no need for the alleged tort or violation of the law of
nations to have occurred within the borders of the U.S.—the only requirement is
that the alleged act occurred and was violative.170
B. The Court was Incorrect in Suggesting that the TVPA Demonstrates that
the ATS is Not Meant to Include Corporations
The Court narrows in on Jordan and Arab Bank’s positions as foreign connections
and “counterterrorism partners” to the U.S., and note that the instant case has put
a strain upon America’s relationship with the two.171 However, it would be in the
best interests of both nations as counterterrorism activists to resolve suits to shut
down corporations that are engaging in terrorist acts, either as a whole or through
their human agents.172

164.

See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
166. Id. at 885.
167. Id. 885–86.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948). Again, the ATS simply reads: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” Nothing is noted about location within these thirty-three words. Id.
171. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1406–07 (2018).
172. Id.
165.
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The Court gave too much deference to the international community when
deciding the immediate case. It ironically noted that the American legal system has
often held corporations liable for the conduct of their “human employees,” but
stated that corporate entities may not be subject to law of nations violations in the
same way.173 Instead the Court explained that while corporations should be subject
to liability if their agents act criminally, the U.S. will not allow liability through the
ATS, since the international community had not yet done so. 174
However, it is arguable that the international community has already agreed to
hold corporate entities accountable. As explained above, the U.S. is a member of
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 175
The treaty reads:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention
if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and
willfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should
be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part,
in order to carry out [terrorist acts, and each party to this Convention is
required] to take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located
in its territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when a person
responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has
[violated the Convention].176
In other words, all international members of the Treaty are expected to hold
corporations liable for using and collecting funds for terrorism. 177 The next step is
to go through the Sosa test and assess whether terrorist financing is a violation of a
norm universally recognized. It is true that corporations are legal entities run by
many individual human agents—the Jesner majority even suggested that
petitioners go after the individual members of Arab Bank who had caused their
grievances.178 However, it likely would not be efficient to bring these claims as class
suits against individual members of the corporation—the named defendants likely
would not have pockets deep enough to satisfy a judgment against them.
Additionally, the court suggested that the individual claims be brought under the
TVPA179 enacted by Congress in 1991.180
173.

Id. at 1402.
Id.
175. See note 131, 132 and accompanying text.
176. Dec. 9, 1999, Art. 2, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-49, 2178 U.N.T.S. 230.
177. See supra text accompanying note 136.
178. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1402, 1405.
179. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1991).
180. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1398. (explaining that the TVPA created an express cause of action for torture
victims and for extrajudicial killing in violation of international law This was done to assuage concerns about
174.
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The Court’s suggestion with regard to individual suits also fails on another level—
the TVPA quite clearly only applies to two certain human rights violations—
”torture” and “extrajudicial killing,”181—neither of which are part of petitioners’
actual claims in the instant case. Petitioners’ claim of financing terrorist
organizations does not fall within this overly narrow option, which is why
petitioners had brought in the case under the ATS (which allows suits for all torts in
violation of the laws of nations brought by foreigners) and the ATA (which allows
for suits against corporate bodies by foreign nationals).182 In and of itself, the
existence of these two laws demonstrates that Congress does not expect
corporations to escape liability. Thus, the Court’s posited alternatives under which
petitioners can bring their claims are, at best, circular suggestions.
In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority,183 that
the term “individual,” as referenced in the TVPA includes only individual natural
persons.184 However, the Mohammad Court conducted a quick comparative
analysis of the TVPA and ATS, writing that the ATS incidentally “offers no
comparative value” to the TVPA.185 The Jesner Court then is quick to revert on its
prior reasoning in Mohammad, and instead state now that the TVPA is not only
comparable with the ATS, but rather it almost wholly redefines the ATS.
C. The Court Overstepped its Bounds as the Judiciary and Enacted a Decision
Meant for the Legislature, and Congressional Silence Should Not Act as a
Bar to Interpretations of the ATS
The Court was correct in stating that Congress should speak on the issue and clarify
what the term “alien” encapsulates within the meaning of the ATS. Ironically,
however, the Court has engaged in judicial activism, by removing the question from
Congress before Congress could consider it. In doing so, the Court has realized the
very fears the Sosa court had warned of—that ATS litigation implicates serious
separation of powers concerns.186 The majority justified this act on their part by
stating that the passing of the TVPA did enough to help petitioners with like
claims.187 However, the TVPA is not helpful to petitioners’ claims at hand, as it is
limited in applicability and facially rejects any liability for anyone other than
whether Filartiga was correct in “holding that plaintiffs could bring ATS actions based on modern human rights
laws absent an express cause of action created by an additional statute.” However, ATS suits had still been
allowed, and Congress had not done away with the ATS or stated that it was to be subsumed within the TVPA.).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1404.
183. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012).
184. Id. at 451–52.
185. Id. at 458.
186. In this case, the court warned of balancing the judicial and legislative powers. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004).
187. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1404 (2018).
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“individual” persons.188 Thus, the TVPA is not another valid route by which
petitioners can bring their claims against Arab Bank as a corporation. The Court
claimed that the passing of the TVPA was Congress’s way of stating that these sorts
of suits should be limited to actions against individuals instead of private entities
like corporations.189
However, Congress’s passing of the TVPA cannot be considered a negation of the
ATS—the TVPA is quite literally a codified note tacked onto the ATS, and merely
provides a route for two very specific causes of action. The Court used the wording
of the TVPA mainly to argue that the ATS applies only to “individuals” instead of
corporations, but the Court appeared hesitant to argue that the actual limitations
set within the TVPA also controls the meaning of the ATS. If Congress supposedly
meant to narrow the entire scope of the ATS with the TVPA, then this also implies
that the only violations of the law of nations allowed under the ATS would be
torture and extrajudicial killing,190 (against only individuals) as was present in
Filartiga.191 However, Sosa demonstrated that many other crimes should be
considered as being violative of norms, including crimes like genocide, summary
execution, and possibly also the funding of terrorist organizations. 192 The Court
should not be able to state that the TVPA demonstrates Congress’s intentions
wholeheartedly, while also picking and choosing which portions of the TVPA should
apply to the Court’s understanding of the ATS. 193
The question previously left untouched in Kiobel II have now been answered too
narrowly. The circuit split demonstrates that the issue of whether the ATS extends
liability to corporations is highly divisive.194 Such a narrow rule excluding all
corporations from consideration is unfavorable, as it precludes any future
discussion of cases such as the one the Jesner petitioners had brought.
Congressional silence is not to be taken as a non-answer. To the contrary, silence
in itself can be an exact answer, because “where Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.”195 Additionally, as the dissent noted, “Congress
has also never seen it necessary to immunize corporations from ATS liability even
188.

Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1991).
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1404.
190. These are the only two causes of action available under the TVPA. Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1991).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 161–163.
192. Stephens, supra note 52 at 5, 10.
193. Justice Sotomayor wrote in her dissent that “because Congress saw fit to permit suits only against
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law-of-nations violations.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 1396 (majority opinion).
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though corporations have been named as defendants in ATS suits for years.”196 If it
was truly such a concern for both foreign and American corporations, it should not
be doubted that the legislation would give due attention to the issue. The ATS has
been used repeatedly in various fields of law in an attempt to bring corporations to
justice,197 and until Congress says it cannot be used for that purpose, the Court
should not nullify its use.
CONCLUSION

In Jesner, the Supreme Court held that the ATS will not impose liability on corporate
entities, even when the employees of such entities may have committed horrific
crimes against humanity; that is, crimes that are looked down upon by the law of
nations.198 This decision is a regressive step for the nation’s highest Court and it has
inadequately justified its decision on the grounds of preserving international
relations. The ATS itself does not provide any specificity as to who may be
considered under the term “alien,” and any further interpretation of this term has
been foreclosed by this Court, unless Congress issues a clarification of the said term.
The Court failed to provide a valid argument to support excluding all corporations
from liability when such entities and their human agents have engaged in such
violations of the law of nations. The Supreme Court should have interpreted the
ATS to include corporations and left it to Congress to clarify otherwise.

196. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1432, (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). See also Monessen Southwestern R. Co. v.
Morgan, 486 U. S. 330, 338 (1988) (stating that “Congress’ failure to disturb a consistent judicial interpretation
of a statute may provide some indication that ‘Congress at least acquiesces in, and apparently affirms [that
interpretation].’” (quoting Cannon v. U. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979))).
197. The ATS has been used not only to address human rights violations, but corporate destruction of the
environment as well; it was one of the initial claims in a litigation against Chevron for oil pollution in Ecuador.
See generally Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2002).
198. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407.
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